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I.  INTRODUCTION 
Sex.  A simple word encapsulating a plethora of emotions.  By now everyone is 
familiar with the President Clinton-Monica Lewinsky scandal, or ZipperGate as it is 
more affectionately labeled by the press.  The President was caught literally “with 
his pants down” in a series of indiscreet sexual encounters with a young, female 
intern.  The scandal rocked his administration and nearly cost him his job.  The 
average citizen was left questioning his motives and lack of judgment.  The Wall 
Street Journal even contemplated whether President Clinton might be a “sex 
addict.”1  Had the President unscrupulously used his power and influence for sexual 
gain?  Or did he simply succumb to the wily charms of a youthful nymphet?  These 
are questions to which no one (other than the affected parties) knows the answer.  
The ramifications of his boorish behavior, however, are unfortunately shared by the 
American public.  The sanctity and prestige of the Presidential office may never 
recover.  Future generations may be forced to examine a candidate’s sexual 
peccadilloes along with his or her political proposals.  But one thing is very clear.  
                                                                
1Sally Satel, Is Clinton Out of Control?, WALL ST. J., Sept. 21, 1998, at A28.  Dr. Jennifer 
P. Schneider lists three key factors for determining sex addiction.  These factors include (1) 
preoccupation with sex, (2) frequent engagement in sex, and (3) continuation of sex despite 
recurrent problems caused by it.  Sex addiction, which is not recognized as a medical term by 
the American Psychiatric Association, may just be another example of society looking for an 
excuse to justify morally unacceptable behavior.  Id. 
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Sex, in the wrong place, or at the wrong time, or even with the wrong person, can 
have serious, serious consequences.  Nothing about sex is simple. 
This note examines “consensual” sexual relationships between non-mental health 
physicians and patients.2  More specifically, it examines whether such relationships 
ever amount to medical malpractice.  Generally, a non-mental health physician 
would be liable under the rubric of medical malpractice only if the sexual 
relationship was commenced under the guise of “medical treatment.”3  Recent cases, 
however, have expanded liability in certain circumstances when the physician-
patient relationship has involved “counseling matters.”  “Counseling matters” 
describes talking to patients about their feelings, or discussing personal problems not 
necessarily related to their proposed treatment.  Medical treatment supplemented by 
“counseling” purportedly requires greater scrutiny due to the higher levels of trust 
and confidence necessary to protect the patients’ interests.4  These cases adopt the 
more rigorous legal approach applied to mental health physicians.  Mental health 
physicians (psychologists and psychiatrists) have routinely been held liable for 
medical malpractice based on sexual relationships with their patients.  This liability 
arises out of mishandling the “transference phenomenon.”5 
The “transference phenomenon,” a Freudian discovery6, involves the creation of 
a father-son, mother-daughter relationship between the doctor and patient which is 
ultimately necessary to promote psychological healing.7  Patients who experience 
such a phenomenon tend to be sexually vulnerable to their therapists.8  Sexual 
contact with a patient, therefore, may cause irreparable harm to the patient’s psyche.9  
A good psychiatrist/ psychologist will avoid acting on this vulnerability and apply 
techniques to lessen it.10  A bad psychiatrist/ psychologist will initiate a sexual 
                                                                
2Compare Victoria J. Swenson, A Proposal for Texas Re: Non-Psychiatric Physicians 
Who Engage in Sexual Conduct with Their Patients, 19 T. MARSHALL L. REV. 269 (1994).  
Swenson states “a ‘voluntary’ relationship is suspect because it presumes that the patient is 
capable of giving an ‘informed consent.’  Given the asymmetric nature of the relationship, it is 
doubtful that this can occur.”  Id. at 270 n.5. 
3See, e.g., Atienza v. Taub, 239 Cal. Rptr. 454, 457 (Ct. App. 1987). 
4See, e.g., McCracken v. Walls-Kaufman, 717 A.2d 346, 1998 WL 574763 (D.C. 1998). 
5See, e.g., Simmons v. United States, 805 F.2d 1363,1365 (9th Cir. 1986). 
6Michael Waldholz, Thinkers Who Shaped the Century - Head Doctor: Doubted and 
Resisted, Freud’s Daring Map of the Mind Endures, WALL ST. J., Dec. 2, 1991, at A1.  Freud 
discovered transference when treating a young woman who displayed intense hostility and 
anger towards him.  Freud realized these emotions were not related to his conduct, but instead 
reflected her attitudes about her father and men in general.  Through the transference process 
the “patient unconsciously begins to repeat troublesome behaviors from childhood with the 
therapist.”  Id.  The therapist’s job is to assist the patient in dealing with transference so that 
any conflicts in life may be successfully resolved.  Id. 
7See Simmons, 805 F.2d at 1365. 
8Id. 
9Id.  A clinical psychologist claimed that “were a therapist to be sexual with a client it 
would be replicating at a symbolic level the situation in which a parent would be sexual with a 
child.  The kinds of harm that can flow from those sorts of violations of trust are similar.”  Id. 
10Id. 
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relationship, or through “countertransference” project his or her unhealthy feelings 
onto a client.11  Transference issues arise, to some degree, in all relationships when 
perceived authority figures exist.12  Psychologists, psychiatrists, counselors, 
physicians, lawyers, and the clergy all deal with transference issues.13  Consequently, 
it is not surprising that all these professions view sex with a client in an unfavorable 
light.14 
The main question this article addresses is whether sexual relations between two 
consensual adults in the physician-patient relationship constitutes medical 
malpractice.  Such a relationship may be unethical.15  Such a relationship may also 
result in severe civil or administrative penalties.16  Such a relationship may even be 
criminal.17  However, this author asserts that in no circumstances does the behavior 
ever rise to medical malpractice.  It would be quite a stretch indeed to hold that a 
physician’s sexual relationship with a patient was substantially related to the 
qualifications, functions, or other duties logically associated with being a doctor.  
Nor would it be logical to presume that such relations arose while in the scope of the 
physician-patient relationship, or that such activities constituted rendition of any 
health care services.  Sexual acts also do not involve the requisite levels of skill and 
care promised to the patient.  And the possible presence of the transference 
phenomenon, by itself, is simply not enough to impose liability for medical 
malpractice onto the non-mental health physician. 
Why debate whether a sexual relationship creates grounds for medical 
malpractice?  Medical malpractice is typically covered under professional-liability 
insurance policies.18  Adverse medical malpractice judgments or settlements increase 
insurance costs.  Increased insurance costs are spread to society as a whole in greater 
health-care costs.  Or in other words, society pays while the doctor and patient play.  
If the relationship is truly consensual, then BOTH parties must bear the brunt of their 
irresponsibility.  Sex, like crime, comes with a cost and imposes societal burdens. 
Part II of this note examines the issues involved in building a fiduciary 
relationship based on trust and confidence.  Medical malpractice will be defined and 
broken down into its relevant parts.  Transference and countertransference will be 
                                                                
11See Rhoda Feinberg & James Tom Greene, Transference and Countertransference 
Issues in Professional Relationships, 29 FAM. L.Q. 111, 114 (1995). 
12Id. at 111. 
13Id. at 111-12. 
14Swenson, supra note 2, at 272-73. 
15The Principles of Medical Ethics with Annotations Especially Applicable to Psychiatry 
(visited Jan. 12,1998) <http://www.psych.org>.  Section 2 , Annotation 1 states “inherent 
inequality in the doctor patient relationship may lead to exploitation of the patient.  Sexual 
activity with a current or former patient is unethical.”  Id. 
16Sandra H. Johnson, Judicial Review of Disciplinary Action for Sexual Misconduct in the 
Practice of Medicine, 270 JAMA 1596, 1597 (1993). 
17Id. 
18Christopher Vaeth, Annotation, Coverage of Professional-Liability or -Indemnity Policy 
for Sexual Contact with Patients by Physicians, Surgeons, and Other Healers, 60 A.L.R.5th 
239 (1998). 
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discussed as it relates to physicians.  Part II also suggests how to avoid 
compromising situations, and lists factors of which every doctor should be aware. 
Part III of this note explores the case law surrounding the sexual relationship as 
grounds for malpractice.  Part III first examines mental health care physician 
liability, and then considers non-mental health care physicians who had sexual 
relations under the guise of treatment.  Part III concludes with a review of the most 
recent cases which discuss liability for physicians who undertake “counseling 
matters.” 
Part IV involves the underlying analysis on why the physician-patient sexual 
relationship should not constitute medical malpractice.  Specifically, Part IV focuses 
on the significance of medical malpractice to the insurance agencies, as well as 
addresses other avenues which can be used to successfully discourage such conduct. 
Finally, this note concludes with some general public policy arguments.  In its 
rush to eliminate any and all things unfair (such as relative bargaining power), 
American society has become overly litigious.  People no longer accept 
responsibility for their own conduct.  The blame always falls soundly upon someone 
else’s shoulders.  This author contends that any rational, semi-intelligent human 
being should know, in advance, that sleeping with his or her doctor may create a 
potential conflict of interest.  This recognition does not mean that doctors should 
have a free pass to avoid their moral obligations.  It simply means that BOTH parties 
have a duty to be responsible.  As the old saying goes “it takes two to tango.” 
II.  BACKGROUND: A FIDUCIARY DUTY BASED ON TRUST AND CONFIDENCE 
The nature of the physician-patient relationship is complex.  As a fiduciary 
relationship, it is grounded in mutual trust and confidence.  The physician is 
required, in good faith, to perform his or her duties at the level of knowledge, skill, 
and standards applicable to the medical profession as a whole.19  The physician is 
“represented to the public as possessing superior knowledge, being worthy of public 
trust, and bound to act in the best interests of patients.”20  The patient, on the other 
hand, enters the relationship at his or her most vulnerable moment.21  The patient’s 
physical and mental well-being depends upon the physician’s competence.22  
Detailed physical examinations along with the patient’s personal revelations and 
insights often accompany most courses of treatment.23  Patients’ vulnerability 
compounded with their obvious dependence on the physician to “cure their ills” 
places the physician in a position of dominance.24  It is this position of dominance, or 
relative disparity of power in the relationship, which has led the American Medical 
                                                                
1961 AM. JUR. 2D Physicians, Surgeons, and Other Healers § 167 (1981). 
20Catherine S. Leffler, Sexual Conduct Within the Physician-Patient Relationship: A 
Statutory Framework for Disciplining This Breach of Fiduciary Duty, 1 SPG WIDENER L. 
SYMP. J. 501, 508 (1996). 
21Id. at 509. 
22Id. 
23Id. 
24Id. at 511. 
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Association (the “AMA”) to conclude that having sexual relations with a current 
patient is unethical.25 
The prohibition against sexual relationships with patients dates back over one 
thousand years to the Hippocratic oath.26  A 1992 survey of practicing physicians 
revealed that nine percent acknowledged sexual contact with one or more patients.27  
And because of the strong and often complex emotions (affection, admiration, 
understanding, and empathy among others) evoked by the physician-patient 
relationship, it is not uncommon or abnormal that sexual attraction between the two 
parties develop.28  This sexual attraction, which by itself may not be deleterious to 
the relationship, can under the right situation lead to sexual contact.29  Sexual 
contact, or a sexual relationship, is viewed as gratifying the physician’s needs at the 
patient’s expense.30  Objectivity of treatment is lost, or at least jeopardized, by 
placing the physician’s focus elsewhere.31  Almost all researchers agree that the 
consequences of a physician-patient relationship are “universally negative or 
damaging to the patient.”32 
The issue of “informed consent”33 also arises.34  If the disparity of the physician-
patient relationship is so great, and its effects so harmful, can a patient or would a 
patient be able to voluntarily consent to such sexual activity?  Physicians have been 
known to exploit their positions to gain sexual favors under the guise of treatment, or 
to take advantage of unconscious or incompetent patients.35  Physicians have also 
abused patients by improperly performing medical procedures or dispensing drugs.36  
Logically, taking it one step further, it may not seem unreasonable due to this 
inequality in bargaining power to presume that in ANY physician-patient sexual 
                                                                
25Sexual Misconduct in the Practice of Medicine, 266 JAMA 2741 (1991). 
26Swenson, supra note 2, at 271.  The Hippocratic oath states “Whatever houses I may 
visit, I will come for the benefit of the sick, remaining free of all intentional injustice, of all 
mischief, and, in particular, sexual relations with both female and male persons, be they free 
or slaves.”  Id. 
27Leffler, supra note 20, at 505.  “The incidence by specialty broke down as follows: 
family practice, 11%; obstetrics/ gynecology, 10%; internal medicine, 6%; and surgery, 9%.”  
Id. 
28Sexual Misconduct in the Practice of Medicine, supra note 25, at 2742. 
29Id. 
30Id. at 2743. 
31Id. 
32Id. at 2742. 
33JOHN W. WADE, ET AL., CASES AND MATERIALS ON TORTS 99 (9th ed. 1994).  “The 
doctrine of ‘informed consent’ requires a physician or surgeon to disclose to the patient the 
risks of proposed medical or surgical treatment.”  Id. 
34Swenson, supra note 2, at 287.  Swenson notes “if a patient were given full, informed 
consent, why would she knowingly engage in such harmful conduct with her physician?”  Id. 
35Glen O. Gabbard & Carol Nadelson, Professional Boundaries in the Physician-Patient 
Relationship, 273 JAMA 1445, 1446 (1995). 
36Id. 
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relationship the doctor is unfairly taking advantage of the patient.37  Seduction of the 
patient occurs through the use of the physician’s status and unfettered authority 
(rather than his or her personality) as an illicit “aphrodisiac.”38  True consent may 
never be gained because consent implies a knowing and informed willingness to 
participate.39  Patients under the influence of their doctors cannot knowingly (by 
realizing the repercussions) “choose” to enter a sexual relationship.40  In effect, the 
relationship has been chosen for them, and the consent is “illusory.”41 
The question then ensues whether a sexual relationship between a physician and 
a patient can occur concurrently BUT independently of treatment.  Some courts still 
recognize the validity of a patient’s consent.42  Some studies even go further and 
claim that sexual contact between the physician and patient can be advantageous.43  
The Journal of American Medicine recognizes that “it is of course possible for a 
physician and a patient to be genuinely attracted to or have genuine romantic 
affection for each other.”44  And of course in most romantic relationships, one party 
tends to have a disproportionate amount of authority over the other.45  The Ohio 
Court of Appeals has stated that “private sexual contact between consenting 
heterosexual adults is protected [by the Constitution] thereby.  Governmental entities 
. . . must act carefully at such times as they seek to sanction or penalize the bedroom 
conduct of consenting adults.”46 
The courts and the AMA seem to be at odds; while the courts recognize 
consensual physician-patient sexual relationships, the AMA does not.  The AMA 
recommends, at a minimum, that the physician terminate the professional 
relationship.47  At this point sexual misconduct only arises if the physician continues 
to use his or her prior professional advantage inappropriately.48  This solution, 
unfortunately, tends to overlook the obvious.  Beginnings and endings of romantic 
endeavors are often fluid and cannot be easily placed along a time continuum.49  All 
                                                                
37Leffler, supra note 20, at 517. 
38Sexual Misconduct in the Practice of Medicine, supra note 25, at 2742. 
39Id. 
40Id. 
41Leffler, supra note 20, at 518. 
42Id. at 524. 
43Steven R. Smith, Mental Health Malpractice in the 1990’s, 28 HOUS. L. REV. 209, 227 
(1991).  The author mentions this view is rejected by most mental health professionals, and 
represents a “small ‘school of thought.’”  Id. 
44Sexual Misconduct in the Practice of Medicine, supra note 25, at 2743. 
45Feinberg & Greene, supra note 11, at 112. 
46In re Pons, No. 91AP-746, 1991 WL 245003, at *1 (Ohio Ct. App. Nov. 14, 1991), rev’d 
on other grounds, 614 N.E.2d 748 (Ohio 1993). 
47Sexual Misconduct in the Practice of Medicine, supra note 25, at 2743. 
48Id. 
49Johnson, supra note 16, at 1598. 
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patients are not alike, and all scientific findings are not absolute.50  And because the 
possibility of a consensual relationship cannot be completely ruled out, it must be 
subsequently recognized.51  A consensual sexual relationship between the physician 
and patient does not necessarily violate the trust and confidence upon which the 
professional relationship is grounded. 
A.  Medical Malpractice 
Medical malpractice is a particular form of negligence which applies when a 
physician fails to exercise the degree of skill and care which is ordinarily employed 
by similar members of the medical profession.52  Typically a cause of action based 
on malpractice may be brought in either contact or tort.53  A plaintiff in a malpractice 
suit must successfully prove four key elements: (1) the physician owed the patient a 
duty; (2) the physician breached that duty; (3) the patient was harmed; and (4) the 
physician’s breach was the proximate cause of that harm.54  Liability only surfaces 
when “the professional has failed to provide the same care as would a reasonably 
prudent professional.”55  The average standard of the profession is used as the 
measuring stick.56  This standard means that the physician is bound to exercise the 
“ordinary care, skill, and diligence as physicians and surgeons in good standing in 
the same neighborhood, in the same general line of practice, ordinarily have and 
exercise in like cases.”57  Only a departure from this standard, by performing a 
service that a similarly-situated physician would not have performed, or by failing or 
omitting to perform a service that a similarly-situated physician would have 
performed, results in negligence.58  The burden of proof and persuasion ultimately 
rests with the plaintiff.59  Expert testimony is typically required to prove these 
elements by the preponderance of the evidence.60 
Establishing a claim of medical malpractice based on a consensual patient-
physician sexual relationship is contravened by one simple premise.  A physician, by 
                                                                
50Id. at 1596. The findings in this area “rel[y] extensively on empirical research relating to 
sexual contact between psychotherapists and patients as a justification.”  These findings were 
then extended to all physicians.  Id. 
51Leffler, supra note 20, at 517.  “The College of Physicians and Surgeons of British 
Columbia has stated that ‘[e]ven though we could envision relationships which are consensual, 
do not hold the potential to compromise medical care, and do not involve exploitation, we 
concluded that these cases will be rare and it is better to absolutely prohibit all sexual contact 
between physicians and patients.’”  Id. 
5261 AM. JUR. 2D Physicians, Surgeons, and Other Healers § 200 (1981). 
5361 AM. JUR. 2D Physicians, Surgeons, and Other Healers § 202 (1981). 
54Leffler, supra note 20, at 522. 
55Smith, supra note 43, at 214. 
5661 AM. JUR. 2D Physicians, Surgeons, and Other Healers § 205 (1981). 
57Id. 
58Id. 
59Id. 
60Leffler, supra note 20, at 524. 
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engaging in an act of a sexual nature, is in no way, shape, or form rendering a 
professional service.61  The Supreme Court of South Carolina has stated that 
[T]he scope of professional services does not include all forms of a 
physician’s conduct simply because he is a physician. . . .  A 
“professional” act or service is one arising out of a vocation, calling, 
occupation, or employment involving specialized knowledge, labor, or 
skill, and the labor or skill involved is predominantly mental or 
intellectual, rather than physical or manual.  In determining whether a 
particular act is of a professional nature or a “professional service” we 
must look not to the title or character of the party performing the act, but 
to the act itself.62 
In an effort to circumvent this common sense approach, and in conjunction with the 
prevailing public policy towards this issue (favoring an absolute prohibition against 
physician-patient sexual contact), the judicial system has manipulated the definition 
of “professional services” by concluding that the sexual acts were inseparable and 
intertwined with the other services provided, or by finding the transference 
phenomenon present.63  Such an approach is contrary to sound legal fundamentals, 
since other avenues (such as criminal prosecution or loss of the license to practice) 
exist which can be used to foster the public policy prescribing a ban against all 
physician-patient sexual relationships.  In these circumstances the law has clearly 
overstepped its bounds and fit inappropriate conduct into a type of action which 
cannot legally or logically support it.  Call it judicial fiction, or “wishful-thinking,” 
but medical malpractice based on a consensual physician-patient sexual relationship 
is just bad law premised on faulty logic. 
B.  Transference Phenomenon 
Each party to a new relationship, whether professional or not, brings with him or 
her some degree of emotional baggage.64  Emotional baggage, which consists of the 
parties’ “wishes, fears, anxieties, hopes, pressures, and psychological defenses,” may 
not be conducive nor appropriate to the new relationship.65  Transference, as it relates 
to the professional relationship, exists when “the client has expectations not 
                                                                
61Willy E. Rice, Insurance Contracts and Judicial Discord over Whether Liability 
Insurers Must Defend Insureds’Allegedly Intentional and Immoral Conduct: A Historical and 
Empirical Review of Federal and State Courts’ Declaratory Judgments 1900-1997, 47 AM. U. 
L. REV. 1131, 1177 (1998). 
62South Carolina Med. Malpractice Liab. Ins. Joint Underwriting Ass’n v. Ferry, 354 
S.E.2d 378, 380 (S.C. 1987) (quoting Marx v. Hartford Accident & Indem. Co., 157 N.W.2d 
870, 872 (1968)). 
63Rice, supra note 61, at 1177-79.  The author notes that many courts have “refused or 
failed to employ various legal doctrines to help determine whether ‘deviant’ physicians and 
medical technicians are ‘rendering professional services.’  Instead these tribunals have 
permitted some generalized notion of public policy to influence whether some insurers . . . 
must defend their insureds in cases involving sexual assaults.”  Id. at 1177-78. 
64Feinberg & Greene, supra note 11, at 111. 
65Id. 
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grounded in current reality but on past personal history, self-image, adopted role in 
life, naive hopes and expectations of a fairy tale outcome of self-validation, or 
perhaps a self-fulfilling prophecy of defeat.”66  Transference issues arise and become 
more pronounced as the degree of neediness, level of stress, and threat of either 
financial, social, or emotional turmoil escalates.67  For these reasons, psychiatrists, 
psychologists, lawyers, and members of the clergy (each in their capacity as 
counselors) all deal with the transference phenomenon to some extent, and may, as a 
consequence, be exposed to potential liability.68 
In a typical physician-patient relationship, one which promotes the patient’s 
quick and full recovery, the physician acts to insulate the patient from his or her 
worries by listening to and addressing any concerns he or she may have.69  The 
physician’s undivided attention enables the patient to develop a sense of security 
(though perhaps a false one) and comfort amenable to the healing process.70  The 
patient, as a result of this attention, begins to either consciously or subconsciously 
look at the physician “as a child would to a caring parental figure.”71  Based on this 
new found level of personal intimacy, idolization of the physician may germinate 
into unrequited feelings of love and affection.72  The magnitude of these feelings 
may even prompt the patient to initiate sexual advances, an aspect of  the 
transference phenomenon which Freud traced to the Oedipus complex.73  It is in this 
context in which the sexual relationship is often analogized to an incestuous 
relationship between father and daughter.74  “Just as the father must deny his 
daughter, the therapist [or physician] must refuse to engage in sexual intercourse 
with his patient.”75  The doctor, in reality, may neither be responsible for nor 
ultimately advance these feelings.76  The patient is simply transferring his or her 
feelings towards a parent or other “significant person” onto the doctor by mere 
association.77 
The mishandling of the transference phenomenon (upon which the medical 
malpractice claim based on a sexual relationship is predicated) has largely been 
                                                                
66Id. 
67Id. 
68Id. at 111-12. 
69Leffler, supra note 20, at 513. 
70Id. 
71Id. 
72Id. 
73Phyllis Coleman, Sex Between Psychiatrist and Former Patient: A Proposal for a ‘No 
Harm, No Foul’ Rule, 41 OKLA. L. REV. 1, 8 (1988).  The Oedipus complex is described as 
when “children often have fantasies of killing the same-sex parent and marrying the parent of 
the opposite sex.”  Id. at 8. 
74Id. 
75Id. at 11. 
76Id. at 6. 
77Coleman, supra note 73, at 6. 
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limited to the psychotherapeutic context alone.78  Judicial opinions have attributed 
this limitation to the uniqueness of the psychiatrist-patient relationship.79  The patient 
pays the psychiatrist or psychologist a fee for listening to his or her deepest thoughts, 
fantasies, and desires, and the psychiatrist or psychologist in return promises to assist 
in resolving any emotional dilemmas.80  Honesty and complete openness are 
requirements for effective treatment.81  As a result of this interaction, the patient’s 
problems are identified and analyzed to discover workable solutions.82  Recognizing 
and utilizing the transference phenomenon is essential to recovery.83  Unresolved 
issues and patterns of repeated behavior affecting “significant others” are uncovered 
to reveal “valuable information about the patient’s pathology.”84  And because the 
patient’s emotional dependence on the mental health professional is so strong, and 
because the negative effects of an “incestuous” sexual relationship are so great, 
medical malpractice based on a sexual relationship between the mental health 
professional and patient was viewed as justified within the law.85 
Of course, the typical non-mental health physician incurs no such responsibilities 
and undertakes no such obligations.  A patient’s pathology is not at issue.  Effective 
treatment does not revolve around displaced feelings affecting significant others.  
While honesty and openness still remain essential to treatment, “complete” openness 
is probably unnecessary.  It is true that transference exists in some form in every 
relationship.86  It cannot be said, however, that the degree of transference that exists 
in every relationship is equal.87  Applying the mishandling of the transference 
phenomenon to non-mental health physicians, as well as to other professionals in a 
fiduciary relationship, involves prescribing a code of conduct which is not based on 
reality. 
The courts which have taken this approach (by presuming physicians who 
undertake “counseling matters” are acting as mental health specialists) have missed 
the point.  It is not the mishandling of the transference phenomenon which should be 
the underlying basis for medical malpractice based on a sexual relationship.  The key 
issue determinative of liability should revolve around the unlimited potential for the 
exploitation and abuse of the patient.88  The proper question to ask should be whether 
the physician has inappropriately used his or her status or the transference 
                                                                
78Johnson, supra note 16, at 1599. 
79Id. 
80Coleman, supra note 73, at 5. 
81Id. 
82Id. 
83Id. at 7. 
84Id. 
85Johnson, supra note 16, at 1599. 
86Coleman, supra note 73, at 9. 
87Id. 
88Id. 
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phenomenon for sexual gain.89  If the answer is no, medical malpractice is not an 
appropriate cause of action.  Non-mental health physicians simply do not foster nor 
encourage the type of emotional bonding that psychiatrists and psychologists 
demand.90  And unless the sexual relationship occurs under the guise of treatment, 
vitiating any implied or explicit consent, the non-mental health physician should not 
be held liable under the doctrine of medical malpractice for a consensual sexual 
relationship. 
C.  Countertransference 
The physician-patient relationship is not dissimilar from other human interactions 
which involve emotional attachment.91  Physicians and patients alike both react to 
environmental stimuli and experience complementary emotional responses.92  
Emotions such as anger, sorrow, anxiety, helplessness, empathy, aversion, joy, and 
fear may all be triggered through the close social contact which defines the 
physician-patient relationship.93  Physicians are not immune to these emotions 
despite their best efforts to maintain a clinical distance and preserve scientific 
objectivity.94  In fact, it is because of this strong emotional interplay that physicians 
often find themselves highly susceptible to a phenomenon Freud called 
“countertransference.”95 
Countertransference describes a physician’s distorted perception of his or her 
patient’s psychic or emotional state.96  Countertransference exists when “a physician 
with personal psychological problems may personalize the patient’s transference 
reaction, and be unable to resist the strong reciprocal feelings of attraction.”97  The 
phenomenon induces “the psychiatrist to experience intense feelings for his patient in 
a manner similar to the way he responded to other significant people in his life.”98  
As a result, the physician may find it difficult to abstain from or avoid acting on any 
implicit sexual overtures.99  The phenomenon may also become more pronounced if 
the physician unduly suffers under the burdens of substance abuse, abnormal 
pressure, or a recent trauma.100  Once believed to be detrimental to the psychological 
treatment process, the countertransference phenomenon is now considered beneficial 
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if identified and used correctly.101  Studying physicians’ emotional responses to 
patients may even provide “important diagnostic insights.”102 
Psychiatrists and psychologists are trained to recognize the phenomenon and 
resolve any inappropriate or improper sexual urges without acting on them.103  Non-
mental health professionals, however, may be circumscribed by their inability to 
perceive the countertransference phenomenon at work.104  Awareness, then, may be 
the sole and limiting factor differentiating a healthy physician-patient relationship 
from one destined to constitute medical malpractice.105  Regardless of his or her 
specialty, the physician is expected to acknowledge the phenomenon and act 
appropriately by avoiding sexual contact, a duty which precludes gratification of any 
sexual countertransferential feelings.106 
In a recent study less than fifty percent of responding non-mental health 
professionals had confronted the issue of physician-patient sexual conduct in medical 
school or residency.107  Only three percent had encountered the issue in continuing 
education classes.108  Part of the disparity in the physician-patient relationship deals 
with the “differential in awareness and knowledge of the transference/ 
countertransference phenomenon.”109  Accordingly, mental health professionals 
(those members of the medical profession trained to recognize and treat the 
phenomenon) have been entrusted with the responsibility of using this advantage 
constructively.110  Non-mental health professionals, however, cannot be held to such 
idealistic standards.  Because both phenomena are largely (if not always) limited to 
the therapeutic relationship alone, non-mental physicians lack the necessary 
competence to diagnose or discern them.111  Failing to recognize the phenomena is 
succinctly different from choosing to exploit them.  Without any physician 
exploitation (which can only come from a fundamental awareness of the 
phenomena), no medical malpractice can exist.  Non-mental health physicians are 
simply incapable of illicitly benefiting from a course of treatment which is foreign to 
the skill and care to which they normally provide.  A lack of the requisite training, 
and a severely limited awareness of the transference/ countertransference 
phenomenon, make exploitation not only highly impractical, but also nearly 
impossible to fathom.  As such, the non-mental health physician should not be held 
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liable for medical malpractice based on his or her inability to effectively recognize or 
resolve the countertransference phenomenon. 
D.  Boundaries and Violations 
Society has always attempted to define and distinguish acceptable standards of 
behavior for its citizens.  These standards are often reflected in the laws, customs, 
and practices adopted by civilized nations.  Attitudes towards marriage, family 
relations, sexual freedom, gender equality, and religious expression are among the 
many issues debated and legislated regularly.  The nature of the physician-patient 
relationship is not unusual in that it too has undergone some degree of societal 
circumspection.  As a result, various medical organizations and governmental bodies 
have taken it upon themselves to further delineate the proper parameters of physician 
conduct.  Beginning with the Hippocratic oath, which expressly prohibited any 
sexual contact between the physician and the patient, organizations such as the 
American Medical Association Council on Ethical and Judicial Affairs, Medical 
Council of New Zealand, and the College of Physicians and Surgeons of British 
Columbia have all addressed the issue of sexual impropriety within the physician-
patient relationship.112  Concluding that all sexual conduct is highly detrimental to 
any course of treatment, these organizations have prescribed “boundaries” or codes 
of conduct onto all applicable physicians.113  Conduct which falls outside of any 
permissible “boundary” is viewed as a breach of the physician’s fiduciary duty, 
irrespective of any mitigating circumstances.114  In this context the “boundary” 
becomes a powerful regulatory tool capable of conforming the physician’s attitudes 
and beliefs with recognized societal norms.  Boundaries, then, are simply another 
means of governing consensual adult behavior within the professional medical 
relationship. 
Boundaries are described as the “limits of a fiduciary relationship in which one 
person (a patient) entrusts his or her welfare to another (a physician), to whom a fee 
is paid for the provision of a service.”115  Boundaries serve to put the public and the 
physician on notice as to what constitutes acceptable professional conduct in the 
practice of medicine.116  “In the physician-patient relationship, these boundaries are 
‘derived from ethical treatise, cultural morality, and jurisprudence.’”117  Topics such 
as the acceptance of gifts, mishandling of fees, types of physical contact, length, 
location, and duration of appointments, and language are examined in relation to the 
“inherent power differential” prevalent in the physician-patient relationship.118  
Sexual contact is considered “the most extreme form of boundary violation” due to 
its potentially devastating impact on patients.119  Psychiatrists and psychologists have 
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jointly recognized the need for boundaries in a therapeutic setting.120  Non-mental 
health professionals, though, have been slower to consider and adopt such 
measures.121  With the inclusion of such boundaries into licensing and disciplinary 
procedures, it becomes necessary (in order to avoid civil or administrative liability) 
to examine their applicability to the non-mental health physician who unwittingly 
takes on “counseling matters.” 
Much of the increased attention placed on boundaries stems from the medical 
professions’ increased interest in prohibiting sexual contact.122  Based on a “slippery 
slope” argument, sexual exploitation is usually preceded by a series of non-sexual 
boundary violations.123  “In this regard, what appear to be trivial violations may in 
reality be considerably more serious when viewed in the context of a [time] 
continuum.”124  By addressing non-sexual boundary violations as well as sexual ones 
(both of which may cause the patient harm), patient exploitation can be at least 
minimized, if not prevented entirely.  Research directed at psychologists and social 
workers has revealed that sexual exploitation “is a pervasive problem in fiduciary 
relationships.”125 
The ideal physician-patient relationship attempts to strike a delicate balance 
“between caring intimacy and objective, professional attachment.”126  Many aspects 
of this relationship, though, make maintaining such a balance difficult.127 
Understanding this important trade-off is essential in determining whether or not a 
physician is guilty of medical malpractice.  Not all boundary violations arise under 
unethical auspices and corrupt motives.128  Some arise due to honest 
misunderstandings, while other minor violations (such as holding and comforting a 
grieving spouse) may be appropriate or even forgivable.129  The AMA has identified 
several examples of nonprofessional sexual behavior which may violate professional 
boundaries: (1) predatory physicians who suffer from serious psychological disorders 
and continually attempt to seduce patients; (2) physicians who claim sex is for 
therapeutic purposes; (3) physicians who abuse the physical examination procedure; 
(4) physicians who ask patients out on a date during an initial visit; (5) physicians 
who have long-standing patient relationships which develop into infatuation; (6) 
rural physicians who are the only practitioners in town and must treat any potential 
romantic partner; (7) physicians who rape or fondle patients; and (8) physicians who 
initiate sexual harassment or makes suggestive comments.130  This list is not intended 
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to be exhaustive nor all-inclusive, but rather illustrates conduct which the AMA 
believes breaches the fiduciary duty.131  The AMA considers education as the 
primary tactic in combating and preventing such undesirable conduct.132 
In examining the list of potential sexual boundary violations, several flaws in its 
reasoning and purpose become readily apparent.  Obviously some of the examples 
represent more serious violations than others.  Categorizing them together, and 
punishing them equally, only re-emphasizes the need for examining each alleged 
violation individually.  A per se rule (one prohibiting all physician-patient sexual 
relationships) is not only overinclusive, but also infringes on the privacy and 
personal freedoms of both the physician and the patient.  Nor can a prohibition 
against a consensual physician-patient sexual relationship be advanced solely on the 
basis of judicial expediency or economy (meting out the same punishment for 
differing boundary violations).  Unless the physician “exploits” his or her position 
for sexual gain, no medical malpractice arises.  The AMA must realize that both 
physicians and patients are “real people experiencing a ‘real’ relationship.”133  
Inevitably, strong feelings or a sexual attraction may arise between the physician and 
his or her charge.134  Just because these feelings grew from the physician-patient 
relationship does not make them illegitimate.135  “It is possible that both parties will 
discover that shared interests would have made them friends, or lovers, had they met 
under other circumstances.”136  For these reasons, a boundary violation might not be 
a “violation” after all.  Free will cannot, and should not, be factored out of the 
physician-patient equation.  Therefore, “boundaries” should only be demonstrative, 
rather than determinative, in helping to prescribe and to advance socially acceptable 
patterns of behavior. 
III.  CASE LAW: THE SEXUAL RELATIONSHIP AS GROUNDS FOR MALPRACTICE 
The courts have identified three categories of cases which examine the sexual 
relationship as grounds for medical malpractice.  The first category of cases deals 
with sexual relationships between the mental health professional and the patient.  
Courts have routinely held mental health professionals (psychiatrists or 
psychologists) liable for engaging in sexual conduct with their patients.137  This 
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liability is based on the “mishandling of the transference phenomenon” which 
includes gratification of the physician’s sexual impulses at the expense of the 
patient’s therapeutic treatment.138  The second category of cases focuses on the non-
mental health professional who induces sexual relations with the patient under the 
guise of treatment.139  In this category of cases, courts have also customarily found 
liability when the sexual relationship was proven to be entered into under false 
pretenses and for illegitimate medical purposes.140  Finally, the third category of 
cases examines the non-mental health professional who in his or her regular course 
of treatment “undertakes counseling matters.”141  Courts who have analyzed cases in 
this area have been less absolute in finding liability.  Sometimes the decision has 
rested on the issue of “whether professional services were involved.”142  Other courts 
have scrutinized the nature of the physician’s fiduciary duty (the trust and confidence 
factor), and delved into the inherent differential in the parties’ bargaining power 
(making the patient’s ability to consent dubious).143  Still other courts have addressed 
public policy concerns ranging from the AMA’s recommendation of an absolute ban 
on physician-patient sexual relationships to the right of individuals to privacy within 
their bedrooms and the freedom of sexual expression.144  It is in this last category of 
cases in which the most potential for societal harm exists.  Defining a consensual 
sexual relationship between the physician and patient as medical malpractice violates 
sound legal fundamentals and promotes judicial activism at the expense of increased 
health care costs.  As long as other more appropriate legal remedies exist (in the 
form of criminal sanctions and administrative penalties), this avenue need not be 
judicially explored. 
A.  Mental Health Professionals and Patients 
Mental health professionals who engage in sexual relationships with their 
patients may be held liable for medical malpractice.  The basis for this liability first 
arose under Zipkin v. Freeman.145  In Zipkin, the patient (Ada Zipkin) sought 
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treatment from Dr. Freeman for persistent diarrhea and headaches.146  After two 
months of psychological treatment, Mrs. Zipkin’s medical conditions completely 
disappeared.147  Afraid she might suffer a relapse, Mrs. Zipkin agreed to continue her 
therapy (with her doctor’s support and encouragement).148  As part of her “therapy,” 
Mrs. Zipkin and Dr. Freeman engaged in sexual relations, attended nude swimming 
parties, skating parties, and other social gatherings, discussed potential joint business 
ventures, filed unmeritorious lawsuits, performed manual labor on a farm (based on 
Dr. Freeman’s belief that Mrs. Zipkin “desired to be a male”), and eventually 
cohabited together (after she left her husband).149  When the relationship soured, and 
because of the tremendous feelings of humiliation and guilt from which she suffered, 
Mrs. Zipkin filed suit against Dr. Freeman for medical malpractice based on the 
“mishandling of the transference phenomenon.”150 
The Supreme Court of Missouri denied Dr. Freeman’s claim that the activities in 
which he and Mrs. Zipkin participated in consisted of “matters extraneous to 
receiving professional treatment.”151  Relying on expert testimony, the court also 
recognized the significance of the transference phenomenon to therapeutic treatment, 
and the potential damage which may flow from its misuse or exploitation.152  Noting 
that psychiatrists have a responsibility in avoiding social relationships with their 
patients, and that treatment should be “handled in the office,” the court recognized 
that “there must have been horrible things going on with her [Mrs. Zipkin] during 
this period.”153  Based on the overwhelming evidence presented at the trial, and the 
damages sustained by Mrs. Zipkin in her negligent treatment (sleepless nights, 
continuing headaches, distrust of her family, and feelings of inadequacy), the court 
held Dr. Freeman liable for medical malpractice.154 
St. Paul Fire & Marine Ins. Co. v. Love155 is another example of a case which 
details the “mishandling of the transference phenomenon.”  In Love, Mrs. Anderson 
sought the psychological services of Dr. Love, an expert in marital counseling and 
behavior modification.156  Mrs. Anderson had been sexually abused as a child and 
was experiencing marital difficulties.157  After five months of treatment, Dr. Love 
and Mrs. Anderson had sexual relations in the counseling center, at an apartment 
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maintained by the doctor, in a car, and at her home.158  This behavior continued until 
Mrs. Anderson’s husband caught them in “the act.”159  As a result, Mrs. Anderson 
and her husband filed suit alleging negligence, breach of contract, medical 
malpractice, and intentional infliction of emotional distress.160  In response, Dr. Love 
tendered defense of the lawsuit to his professional liability insurer (St. Paul Fire & 
Marine).161 
The insurance company denied coverage on the grounds that the claims did not 
result from the performance of professional services.162  The Supreme Court of 
Minnesota, however, rejected this argument after closely examining the influence of 
the transference/countertransference phenomenon in the psychotherapeutic 
relationship.  Explaining that the therapist has a duty to reject the patient’s erotic 
overtures, and must, in severe cases, discontinue treatment and refer the patient to 
another therapist, the court found that Dr. Love “used his professional role and 
authority status as an occasion and pretext to take advantage of his patients.”163  
Because the therapist alone elicits the transference/countertransference phenomenon 
as part of the therapeutic treatment, an aberrant and unacceptable use of it falls 
within the scope of professional services covered by the insurance agency.164  The 
supreme court found that the insurance policy covered the Anderson’s claims.165 
Both Zipkin and Love show the courts’ willingness to find medical malpractice 
based on a sexual relationship when a mishandling of the transference phenomenon 
occurs.  The need for the patient to reveal his or her innermost thoughts, the 
psychiatrist’s or psychologist’s awareness and expertise in this area, and the potential 
for exploitation and infliction of emotional damage to the patient all make this 
decision a prudent course of action.  Unlike non-mental health professionals, whose 
services normally do not entail any handling of the transference phenomenon, mental 
health professionals are uniquely aware of the ramifications involved in providing 
negligent treatment.  Anytime that sexual conduct arises within the context of the 
patient’s problem and prescribed treatment, courts will necessarily find psychiatrists 
or psychologists liable for medical malpractice.  The case law in this area is 
relatively clear, and the courts have taken a position of zero tolerance.   
B.  Non-Mental Health Physicians Under the Guise of Treatment 
Courts have also held non-mental health physicians liable for medical 
malpractice when sexual relations with the patient come under the guise of treatment.  
In Dillon III v. Callaway,166 Mrs. Callaway was hospitalized for multiple joint 
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pain.167  Dr. Chambers, her treating physician, recommended therapy (even though 
he was not a practicing psychiatrist) after being unable to ascertain a physical cause 
for her injuries.168  The conversations between Mrs. Callaway and Dr. Chambers 
revealed that Mrs. Callaway was having sexual problems in her marriage and had 
been sexually abused by her father.169  Under the guise of treatment, Dr. Chambers 
and Mrs. Callaway entered into a “bizarre” and “sadomasochistic” sexual 
relationship.170  After several years of this “treatment,” Mrs. Callaway conferred with 
another physician.171  Under the new physician’s care she was hospitalized and 
diagnosed as suffering from severe depression, anorexia, and agoraphobia, all 
determined to be a result of Dr. Chambers’s “medical activities.”172  Consequently, 
Mrs. Callaway filed a medical malpractice action.173 
Dr. Chambers and his insurer settled their liability with Mrs. Callaway, and she 
sought excess damages payable from the Indiana Patient’s Compensation Fund.174  
The Indiana Second District Court of Appeals found she was entitled to such funds 
based on Dr. Chambers’s use of therapy as a pretext for engaging in sexual relations, 
thus defeating the Compensation Fund Administrator’s argument that the injuries did 
not result from the provision of health care services.175  The court acknowledged the 
undue influence Dr. Chambers had exerted over Mrs. Callaway, and accordingly 
held she was entitled to be fully compensated for the nature of her injuries.176 
In Wall v. Noble,177 Texas courts again found medical malpractice liability when 
a physician-patient sexual relationship was commenced under the guise of treatment.  
Ms. Noble consulted Dr. Wall in response to a medical condition that caused her 
breasts to sag.178  Dr. Wall, a plastic surgeon, performed three breast-lift surgeries to 
alleviate this disquieting condition.179  After the first surgery, Ms. Noble and Dr. 
Wall began a sexual liaison.180  This pattern of sexual behavior was premised on Dr. 
Wall’s promise that “I am your doctor–trust me,” a statement which he repeated 
frequently when initiating a sexual advance.181  After the condition of her breasts 
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failed to improve, Mrs. Noble filed a medical malpractice action claiming that Dr. 
Wall had negligently performed her surgeries, and had negligently engaged in a 
sexual relationship with her causing a breach of his fiduciary duty.182 
The Texarkana Court of Appeals affirmed the trial court’s judgment for Ms. 
Noble.183  Claiming that “the evidence of the sexual liaison was relevant, competent, 
and material in determining the physician’s compliance with the standards of care,” 
and concluding that the issue of when “treatment ended and a consensual sexual 
liaison began” was best left with the jury, the court found Dr. Wall liable on both 
grounds for medical malpractice.184 
Callaway and Wall represent the types of physician exploitation should always be 
actionable.  Physicians who use their office or status for sexual gain are illicitly 
benefiting from the advantages placed upon them by society.  In misusing their 
positions of authority and perverting the nature of their care, these physicians are 
demeaning the medical profession.  A physician-patient sexual relationship 
undertaken in this manner can never be deemed consensual, because it will always 
be fraudulently induced.  And because the sexual relationship is entered into under 
the guise of treatment, the sexual conduct becomes indistinguishable from the other 
legitimate services the physician may provide.  Courts, again, have had little 
difficulty in holding physicians liable for medical malpractice when they engage in 
such tactless behavior. 
C.  Non-Mental Health Physicians Who Take on Counseling Matters  
The non-mental health physician who undertakes “counseling matters” may also 
be held liable for medical malpractice based on a sexual relationship.  “Counseling 
matters” describes behavior in which the physician “enters into a relationship of trust 
and confidence with a patient and offers counseling on personal matters to that 
patient, thus taking on a role similar to that of a psychiatrist or psychologist.”185  
Courts examining cases in this area have reached strikingly dissimilar conclusions, 
finding liability in some instances and determining non-suits in others.  To provide 
guidance in formulating this “new” area of medical malpractice liability, the courts 
have weighed a variety of factors including, but not limited to, public policy 
concerns, the scope of the physician-patient relationship, and the right to privacy and 
personal autonomy. 
Liability has often rested on the courts’ determination of whether the services 
provided were truly professional in nature (versus personal), or alternatively, 
whether in the courts’ opinion the physician has grossly exploited his or her superior 
authoritative position for mere sexual advantage and personal gain (versus mutual 
consent and willing participation).  The courts who have expanded liability in this 
area, regardless of any beneficent motives, are guilty of overlooking the obvious.  
Not every act performed by the physician arises out of the physician-patient 
relationship.  And consequently, not every action taken by the physician represents 
adequate legal grounds for asserting medical malpractice.  Failing to recognize such 
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an important distinction ignores sound legal principles and punishes the physician for 
his or her status rather than for his or her undesirable behavior.  The courts must 
come to the realization that consensual physician-patient sexual relationships are 
simply beyond judicial scrutiny and societal intervention. 
One of the first cases to deal with a physician who undertakes “counseling 
matters” is Hoopes v. Hammargren.186  In Hoopes, Mrs. Hoopes sought treatment 
from Dr. Hammargren, a neurosurgeon, for multiple sclerosis.187  Recognizing the 
emotional liability associated with the disease, which affects the nervous system, Dr. 
Hammargren prescribed quaaludes, valium, elavil, triavil, meprobamate, chloral 
hydrate, phenobarbitol, seconal, and talwin to combat her anxiety.188  These drugs are 
depressants with the “recognized potential for physical and psychological 
dependence.”189  Three months after Mrs. Hoopes’ initial visit, Dr. Hammargren 
invited her out to dinner and then back to his office to “see his iguanas.”190  Mrs. 
Hoopes and Dr. Hammargren then commenced a sexual relationship lasted nearly 
five years until she relocated to get married.191  After consulting with another doctor, 
Mrs. Hoopes learned that she exhibited no signs of multiple sclerosis, and even if she 
had, Dr. Hammargren’s prescriptions were not a typical course of treatment.192  
Upset by Dr. Hammargren’s apparent deception based on the improper prescriptions, 
the misdiagnosis of her condition, and the breach of the applicable standard of care 
based on the resulting sexual relationship, Mrs. Hoopes filed a medical malpractice 
action. 
The trial court granted summary judgment to Dr. Hammargren.193  The Supreme 
Court of Nevada reversed the trial court, holding that substantial evidence supporting 
Mrs. Hoopes’s mistreatment and sexual advantage claims precluded summary 
judgment.194  Examining the fiduciary nature of the physician-patient relationship, 
which is built on trust and confidence, and the duty of good faith imposed on Dr. 
Hammargren, the court concluded that taking “sexual advantage of the physician-
patient relationship can constitute malpractice.”195  The court determined that for 
Mrs. Hoopes to prevail at trial, she must prove by a preponderance of the evidence 
that one, Dr. Hammargren held a superior authoritative position in the relationship; 
two, her medical condition left her mentally and emotionally “vulnerable”; and three, 
Dr. Hammargren unethically and illicitly exploited this vulnerability.196  Mrs. Hoopes 
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must also show that Dr. Hammargren’s actions were the proximate cause of her 
injuries.197  By treating Mrs. Hoopes’s psychological needs as well as her physical 
injuries, Dr. Hammargren’s conduct in the form of a sexual relationship created new 
grounds for medical malpractice. 
The District of Columbia Court of Appeals in McCracken v. Walls-Kaufman198 
applied a similar rationale when it examined as a matter of first impression whether a 
chiropractor could be held liable for malpractice for engaging in sexual activity with 
a patient.  Dr. Walls-Kaufman provided chiropractic treatment to Mrs. McCracken.199  
During the course of her treatment she discussed personal matters with Dr. Walls-
Kaufman, and he in return offered advice and counseling.200  Mrs. McCracken 
alleged that Dr. Walls-Kaufman sodomized her on approximately six occasions, and 
was unable to fend off these “assaults” due to a valium addiction of which Dr. Walls-
Kaufman had prior knowledge.201  Accordingly, Mrs. McCracken filed a medical 
malpractice claim.202 
The District of Columbia Court of Appeals held that Mrs. McCracken stated a 
viable claim for medical malpractice.203  The court concluded that if a non-mental 
health physician enters into a relationship of trust and confidence with a patient, and 
takes on a role similar to that of a psychiatrist or psychologist by offering counseling 
on personal matters, the physician would be bound to “the same standards as would 
bind a psychiatrist or psychologist in a similar situation.”204  The court required Mrs. 
McCracken to demonstrate on remand that one, the two engaged in a sexual 
relationship; two, during the course of the chiropractic treatment a psychologist-
patient relationship had developed; and three, by engaging in a sexual relationship, 
Dr. Walls-Kaufman breached the applicable standard of care.205  Expert testimony 
would be necessary to establish these elements conclusively.206  In reaching this 
determination, the District of Columbia Court of Appeals creatively circumvented 
two barriers preventing Mrs. McCracken’s tort recovery.  First, the court ruled that 
the same course of conduct (i.e. the “assaults”) may support both a medical 
malpractice (professional negligence) and an intentional tort claim.207  Second, by 
characterizing Dr. Walls-Kaufman’s conversations as “counseling,” the court could 
apply the more rigorous medical malpractice standard typically confined to members 
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of the mental health profession.208  The McCracken decision represents the pinnacle 
of judicial activism in medical malpractice liability. 
Hoopes and McCracken are both examples of court decisions aimed at 
broadening traditional notions of physician malpractice liability and prohibiting 
consensual physician-patient sexual relationships.  Other courts, however, have been 
less willing to apply such strict legal standards.209 
In Odegard v. Finne III,210 the Minnesota Court of Appeals affirmed summary 
judgment in favor of Dr. Finne on Mrs. Odegard’s intentional infliction of emotional 
distress and medical malpractice claims.211  Dr. Finne performed eleven surgeries on 
Mrs. Odegard to alleviate the ulcerative colitis from which she suffered.212  This 
medical condition caused her to experience eating difficulties, and negatively 
affected her self-esteem.213  After her medical condition significantly improved 
following the last surgery, Mrs. Odegard and Dr. Finne initiated a sexual 
relationship.214  As a result of this relationship, Dr. Finne asked Mrs. Odegard to 
marry him, contingent upon both parties obtaining a divorce from their present 
spouse.215  The relationship ended when Dr. Finne decided to return to his wife and 
child.216 
The Minnesota Court of Appeals refused to recognize Mrs. Odegard’s claim that 
a psychologist-patient relationship (based on the presence of the transference 
phenomenon) had developed, stating “transference is not a recognized component in 
the medical treatment of physical conditions.”217  The court further held that non-
mental health physician liability would be restricted to situations in which the sexual 
relationship was commenced under the “guise of treatment.”218  Finding no facts to 
support a claim that the relationship was anything other than “consensual,” the court 
reasoned that “essentially appellant [Mrs. Odegard] complains that she had an 
unhappy affair with a man who happened to be her doctor.  This [complaint] is 
plainly insufficient to make out a cause of action for professional negligence.”219 
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Newland v. Azan220 provides another example of a court refusing to expand non-
mental health physician malpractice liability.  In Newland, Dr. Azan performed a 
root canal and other related procedures for Ms. Newland.221  While she was sitting in 
the dental chair, and after being given several painkiller shots, Dr. Azan “touched her 
pubic area, kissed her, caressed her cheek and hand, rubbed his own genital area, and 
made sexually suggestive comments.”222  Following treatment, Ms. Newland filed a 
petition claiming professional negligence (medical malpractice), battery, and 
intentional infliction of distress.223 
The trial court granted summary judgment to Dr. Azan on the professional 
negligence claim.224  The Missouri Court of Appeals affirmed concluding “it must be 
a dental act or service that caused the harm, not an act or service that requires no 
professional skill.”225  The court also found no evidence linking the sexual contact to 
any “course of dental treatment,” nor to the presence or commencement of a 
psychologist-patient relationship.226  Finding that “unlike the therapist-patient 
relationship, there is nothing inherent in the typical relationship between a patient 
and a dentist that makes the patient unusually susceptible to accept the sexual 
advantages of the dentist,” the court refused to apply the more rigorous malpractice 
liability standard applicable to mental health physicians.227 
Odegard and Newland illustrate sound judicial reasoning.  By recognizing the 
lack of professional services implicated in a sexual relationship, and the absence of 
any psychologist-patient relationship in the typical course of medical treatment, these 
courts have refused to allow malpractice recovery for patients suffering from 
“broken hearts.”  Because this policy is socially advantageous (it makes both parties 
responsible for their “bedroom antics”), as well as legally and economically 
practical, Odegard and Newland should be embraced by the judiciary.  Physician-
patient consensual sexual relationships are simply that, consensual.  Punishing one 
party (the physician) for the lack of good judgment shown by BOTH parties reflects 
an outdated view of humanity and promotes gross social irresponsibility.  The costs 
of a physician-patient sexual relationship should be borne by the parties involved, at 
no expense to the average everyday citizen who recognizes the need for approaching 
such a situation with extreme care and prejudice.  The non-mental health physician’s 
liability for medical malpractice based on a sexual relationship must be limited to 
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those rare situations which involve exploitation of the patient under the “guise of 
treatment.” 
IV.  ANALYSIS 
The effects of the physician-patient sexual relationship permeate numerous facets 
of American life.  The patient, the physician, hospitals, insurers, insureds, the 
judiciary, the legislature, the AMA, the APA (American Psychiatric Association), 
state licensing boards, and medical ethics committees all assert legally recognized 
interests in defining the proper parameters of physician-patient conduct.  Conflicts, 
therefore, are certain to arise.  To resolve these conflicts it becomes necessary to 
complete a cost-benefit analysis, one aimed at balancing society’s interest in 
adequate medical treatment with an individual’s right to privacy and autonomy in 
personal relationships.  Three parties, however, the patient, the physician, and the 
insurers, warrant special attention.  Because these parties stand to gain or lose the 
most by maintaining or changing the status quo, any such analysis must first begin 
by examining their rights and duties in retrospect to each other.  Only then may a 
proper distinction be drawn between legally permissible behavior (a consensual 
physician-patient sexual relationship), and behavior which is potentially unethical or 
criminally suspect (sexual relationships occurring in therapeutic settings or under the 
guise of treatment). 
The benefits resulting from judicial recognition of physician-patient consensual 
sexual relationship, are largely intangible.  As anyone who has ever experienced a 
romantic relationship will be able to tell you, love can be a glorious thing.  With it 
flows all of the emotions and intimate associations necessary to create a lifetime of 
fulfillment.  Principles such as honesty, dedication, and mutual trust serve as bridges 
bringing people closer together, and also act as barriers insulating partners from the 
harshness of society.  A romantic relationship between a doctor and a patient is no 
different.  A relationship is no less “real” because its parties consist of a doctor and 
his or her patient, than one whose members consist of a baker and a cabinetmaker.  It 
is of course true that a physician-patient relationship encourages a close bond to 
facilitate healing.228  It is also true that initially the physician maintains a superior 
position in the relationship.229  But like all relationships based on “chance 
circumstances,” nothing prevents the parties involved from altering or modifying 
their current “bargaining” positions.  In fact, most valid relationships will undergo 
long-term changes to better reflect the parties’ mutual needs and wants.  Love, no 
matter where you find it, simply cannot be trivialized. 
Another intangible benefit springs from the physician’s and patient’s 
fundamental rights to privacy.230  Physicians are expected to work long and arduous 
hours curing disease and treating the sick and injured.  The longer hours the 
physician works, the less time that exists for pursuit of social endeavors.  By 
effectively banning fraternization with certain classes of patients (the AMA has 
banned sexual relationships with current patients, as well as considered bans on 
former patients and relatives of patients), the nature and quality of the physician’s 
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life is negatively affected.  Through such regulation the AMA is essentially 
eliminating the physician’s ability to “choose” among certain prospective romantic 
partners and potential spouses.  Instead of “narrowly tailoring” its prohibitions to 
physicians who exploit their patients by commencing a sexual relationship under the 
guise of treatment, the AMA attempts to abridge the rights of consenting adults to 
privately engage in constitutionally-protected behavior.  Physicians, as well as 
patients, deserve the opportunity to pursue intimate associations free of any unfair 
and unmeritorious impositions based solely upon their status in the professional 
relationship.  Undoubtedly, the “right to happiness” falls outside of the AMA’s 
regulatory capabilities. 
Limiting medical malpractice to non-consensual physician-patient sexual 
relationships also benefits insurance companies.  “Each year in America, consumers, 
homeowners, small businesses, corporations, directors and officers, private 
individuals, professionals, private and public institutions, and associations spend an 
estimated $200 billion purchasing third-party liability insurance from property and 
casualty insurers.”231  Physicians purchase liability insurance to protect themselves 
from adverse judgments resulting from damages sustained in “providing or 
withholding professional services.”232  Purchasing insurance also provides third-party 
victims, or the patients in this instance, a viable means of economic recovery for 
their injuries.  Accordingly, to limit their liability and maintain price controls, 
insurance agencies often try to exclude coverage for “intentional and immoral” 
acts.233  Physicians who engage in sexual conduct with their patients would logically 
fall within this exclusion.  But unfortunately, time and time again, insurers are asked 
(or ordered by the courts in duty-to-defend declarations) to defend policy-holding 
physicians who engage in such behavior.234  “Insuring” consensual sexual conduct, 
and forcing insurers to provide legal defenses for non-professional acts, unfairly 
imposes the “costs” associated with the romantic relationship onto society.  These 
“costs” include acquiescing to potentially unethical and undesirable behavior (the 
physician-patient sexual relationship), and ultimately are reflected in greater health 
care expenditures and rising malpractice premiums. 
Courts who have been faced with this moral dilemma have not surprisingly 
reached inconsistent judgments.  Notions of public policy, and overriding concerns 
regarding the health and welfare of the patient, have influenced courts to restrict or to 
ignore the language limiting insurance coverage to the “rendering of professional 
services.”  Courts have also confusingly drawn legal distinctions between certain 
types of physicians (the gynecologist versus the medical technician) in determining 
whether the sexual conduct has become “intertwined with and inseparable from the 
other services provided.”235  Courts reaching either conclusion have largely abused 
their judicial discretion.  A consensual physician-patient relationship can never 
constitute the rendering of professional services.  In examining the nature of the 
sexual act, the courts should focus not on the physician’s specialty or presumed 
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authoritative position in the relationship, but instead on whether the physician has 
used his or her professional status to “sexually exploit” the patient.  “Exploitation” of 
the patient would be limited to situations which involve commencing a sexual 
relationship under the guise of treatment, mishandling of the transference 
phenomenon in the therapeutic setting, and taking advantage of unconscious or 
incapacitated patients unable to physically or mentally fend for themselves.  All of 
these situations arise under the auspices of the professional relationship, and 
consequently, insurers would have a duty to defend such claims.  By limiting insurer 
liability to physician “exploitation,” consensual physician-patient sexual 
relationships fall outside the scope of insurable behavior.  With no duty to defend 
these relationships, insurers are provided with the legal certainty and economic 
wherewithal necessary to maintain reasonable premiums and to promote efficient 
resolution of outstanding claims.  The benefits to insurers, therefore, are more 
tangible (monetary) than intangible. 
Finally, the most tangible benefit results from clarifying the structure of 
physician regulation.  Other avenues exist to deter unwanted and undesirable 
physician behavior.  Criminal penalties such as rape, statutory rape, and sexual 
assault exist to prevent “the most egregious instances of physician sexual misconduct 
- involving minor patients, or the use of drugs, anesthesia, or force to prevent or 
overcome resistance.”236  Four states (Colorado, Michigan, New Hampshire, and 
Wyoming) have also criminalized sexual contact under the “guise of treatment.”237  
Additionally, thirteen states have adopted some form of criminal sanctions governing 
physician sexual misconduct.238  Nine of these statutes “cover sexual contact both 
within and outside actual treatment sessions during an ongoing professional 
relationship.”239  Two statutes are limited to sexual misconduct occurring during the 
medical treatment or examination, and the other two statutes apply to sexual 
misconduct occurring outside of the actual treatment sessions when the patient has 
become emotionally dependent upon the physician or therapist.240  The majority of 
these statutes are worded broadly enough to encompass both mental health and non-
mental health physicians, and have withstood constitutional due process and equal 
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protection challenges.241  Criminal sanctions obviously present a substantial deterrent 
to physician misconduct.242 
Administrative penalties also exist.  “The practice of medicine is a privilege 
granted by the states via licensing procedures.”243  States through medical boards 
enforce statutes and regulations governing physician conduct.244  The medical boards 
have a duty to protect the public and prevent physician exploitation at the expense of 
the patient.245  Administrative regulation of physicians also provides “substantial 
advantages and benefits to the victim over civil and criminal controls.”246 
The rules of evidence and burdens of proof are generally more relaxed in an 
administrative hearing.247  Typically no statute of limitation exists, and the patient’s 
prior sexual history is protected (by not being disclosed) under victim-shield 
provisions.248  Medical boards also have a wide range of available sanctions at their 
disposal.249  These sanctions include license suspension, license revocation, practice 
restrictions, mandatory counseling, and compulsory state monitoring.250  Physician 
misconduct is also judged by those members of society most capable of determining 
its presence, i.e., other similarly-situated physicians.  Peer review and damage to 
one’s professional reputation also serve as strong behavioral restraints.  
Administrative sanctions, including the potential loss of the physician’s livelihood, 
afford patients another option to redress their alleged injuries. 
Limiting medical malpractice to situations which involve physician 
“exploitation” does not leave patients “out in the cold.” If the conduct rises to 
criminally prosecutable behavior, or violates a specified provision in the physician’s 
license to practice medicine, the physician’s conduct will not go unpunished.  
Indeed, the only fundamental change results in the type of “compensation” the 
patient is entitled to.  In truly consensual physician-patient sexual relationships, the 
patient is entitled to no recovery.  In situations in which the nature of the relationship 
is less definitive, the patient may receive satisfaction in knowing the physician’s 
conduct will be reviewed by others.  In the most extreme cases, including those 
instances in which the physician engages in sexual relations under the guise of 
treatment, both criminal and civil remedies will be available and appropriate.  This 
author simply contends that the punishment should correspond to the nature of the 
crime.  The regulation of physicians must reflect the same traditional notions of “fair 
play” recognized in other areas of the law. 
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The costs of recognizing a consensual physician-patient sexual relationship fall 
primarily upon the patient’s not-so-broad shoulders.  These costs are not 
insignificant nor insubstantial.  Medical studies have shown that 85-90% of patients 
who engage in sexual contact with their physicians consider it as “damaging.”251  
“Similar to the reactions of women who have been sexually assaulted, female 
patients tend to feel angry, abandoned, humiliated, mistreated, or exploited by their 
physicians.”252  Patients may also suffer from “depression, anxiety, sexual disorders, 
sleeping disorders, and cognitive dysfunctions and are at risk for substance abuse.”253  
These feelings and emotions lead patients to eventually distrust their own judgments, 
and breed mistrust and resentment towards physicians in general.254  Physicians who 
initiate sexual contact for simple self-gratification, or who aim to humiliate or exploit 
patients, are also acting contrary to the duties and ethical obligations imposed upon 
them by society.  A physician’s moral obligation to his patient dictates that the 
physician act responsibly at all times, and encourages physicians to proceed both 
personally and professionally with due caution and considerable foresight.  The 
sanctity and prestige of the entire medical profession reflects the judgments and 
actions of its individual members. 
It is important to recognize that the above-mentioned medical studies are based 
on patients who have initiated disciplinary actions against physicians or therapists.255  
Patients not harmed by consensual sexual relationships “may have escaped the 
attention of researchers.”256  And at the termination of all romantic relationships 
(regardless of the professional make-up of its constituents) feelings of anger, 
abandonment, humiliation, and mistreatment are not uncommon or unusual.  The 
patient’s solution is simple.  Just say no.  Just say no to the physician, or be willing 
to accept the social, moral, and legal consequences stemming from willful 
participation.  Just say no. 
A recognition of the physician-patient consensual sexual relationship comports 
with reality.  Relationships of this nature do exist, and prospective partners enter 
such relationships voluntarily.  Perhaps society would be better off by prescribing an 
absolute ban on all physician-patient sexual relationships.  The AMA certainly thinks 
so.  Medical studies tend to support this conclusion.  Judicial decrees and medical 
ethics committee resolutions promulgate such behavioral prohibitions.  Proponents 
are also quick to point out the presence of the transference phenomenon and the 
physician’s authoritative status in the relationship.  Certainly, a relationship with so 
many “negatives” must be contrary to the public “good.”  The analysis, however, 
must not stop here.  The physician’s conduct should be evaluated in its entirety under 
a “totality of the circumstances” test.  No exploitation, no violation.  Consensual 
physician-patient sexual relationships are a fact of life.  While such relationships 
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may not be desirable, nor medically conducive, allowing patients to recover under 
the rubric of medical malpractice denotes strong judicial improvidence. 
V.  CONCLUSION 
Nothing about sex is simple.  People who regularly engage in sex often do so 
without fully comprehending the emotional and psychological consequences which 
are sure to follow.  Physician-patient sexual relationships differ from conventional 
sexual relationships in only one aspect - they involve a physician and a patient.  The 
presence of the transference or countertransference phenomenon, the physician’s 
authoritative status, the providing of professional services, the inherent conflicts and 
obligations implicated by the Hippocratic oath, and the creation of boundaries to 
deter physician misconduct all become irrelevant when the patient implicitly 
consents to a sexual relationship.  True consent can be fully given even though 
neither party initially recognizes the social undesirability and high obstacles which 
must be overcome to make such a relationship a “success.” 
Once the physician and the patient enter a consensual sexual relationship, the 
judiciary must take a “hands-off approach.”  While inappropriate non-voluntary 
sexual conduct will continue to be harshly punished and severely scrutinized, 
voluntary sexual conduct cannot and should not fall under the doctrine of medical 
malpractice.  Allowing patients to recover, and insurers to pay, and physicians to be 
held liable for conduct which occurs outside of the professional relationship makes 
little sense.  People must learn to accept responsibility for their actions.  Subsidizing 
stupidity, and discounting common sense are “bad” public policies for the judiciary 
to promote.  Malpractice recovery must be limited to those circumstances which 
involve physician “exploitation.”  Otherwise, society pays while the doctor and 
patient play. 
Sex, in the wrong place, or at the wrong time, or even with the wrong person, can 
have serious, serious, consequences. 
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